Governments are investing heavily in national quantum capabilities, but the industry they are trying to secure is already deeply international. As quantum computing moves towards industrial scale, technological sovereignty will increasingly depend on the ability to manage critical supply chains, maintain trusted partnerships and protect access to the specialised technologies that make quantum systems possible.

Quantum computing has become an increasingly important part of national technology strategies. Across Europe, North America and Asia, governments are investing in research, manufacturing facilities, computing infrastructure and the development of domestic quantum industries. These programmes reflect a growing recognition that quantum technologies could become strategically important capabilities, influencing economic competitiveness, industrial security and technological independence.

Yet there is a fundamental tension developing between these national ambitions and the industrial structure emerging around quantum computing. The technologies being developed within national programmes rely on components, materials, manufacturing processes and specialist expertise that frequently originate elsewhere. As the industry expands, its international dependencies are becoming more visible, raising difficult questions about what governments can realistically expect technological sovereignty to deliver.

The challenge is particularly relevant for Europe, where the ambition to establish a globally competitive quantum industry must be balanced against the practical realities of an international technology ecosystem.

The international reality behind national ambition

The scale of these international relationships became clearer in September when six leading quantum industry associations published the Global Quantum Supply Chain Flows study. Based on responses from 160 companies headquartered across 15 countries, the research identified suppliers operating in 36 countries, manufacturing locations in 25 and customers across 49.

Ninety percent of respondents reported having at least one foreign supplier, while 74% served customers outside their home country. Significantly, international relationships were common even among companies employing fewer than ten people, suggesting that cross-border collaboration is embedded in the industry’s development from its earliest commercial stages.

The study provides a useful picture of an industry that is already internationally interconnected, although the figures require careful interpretation. The presence of a foreign supplier does not automatically represent a strategic vulnerability, just as domestic sourcing does not necessarily guarantee security of supply. The more important questions concern the criticality of particular components, the availability of alternative suppliers and the consequences should access to a necessary technology be interrupted.

These distinctions will become increasingly important as quantum systems move towards commercial deployment. A supply chain that functions effectively during research and development may face different pressures when manufacturers begin producing equipment at greater scale, customers require guaranteed availability and technology providers must support installed systems over extended periods.

Where dependencies become strategic

Quantum computers require an unusually specialised combination of technologies. Depending on the underlying architecture, systems may depend on dilution refrigerators capable of operating at extremely low temperatures, precision laser systems, sophisticated control electronics, specialist semiconductor fabrication processes and materials manufactured to demanding specifications.

Many of these capabilities are available from relatively small groups of specialist suppliers, creating potential vulnerabilities that are difficult to address through conventional procurement strategies.

Research published in EPJ Quantum Technology earlier this year examined these dependencies through a framework assessing supply risk, substitutability and strategic significance. The analysis identified potential constraints associated with specialised materials, cryogenic equipment and manufacturing technologies, demonstrating why the availability of an alternative supplier cannot always be assumed.

The implications extend beyond the quantum processor itself. A country may possess the scientific expertise and domestic facilities necessary to develop advanced quantum hardware while remaining dependent on imported equipment needed to manufacture, test, cool or control those systems.

For companies attempting to scale production, disruption to one specialist supplier could become more consequential than delays in the development of the processor itself. Manufacturing capacity, delivery schedules and customer commitments increasingly depend on the reliability of the wider industrial ecosystem.

This suggests that a useful measure of quantum sovereignty should include the ability to understand and manage such dependencies, rather than relying primarily on the geographical location of research institutions or hardware manufacturers.

Europe’s sovereignty challenge

The European Union’s Quantum Europe Strategy, adopted in July 2025, reflects an ambition to transform Europe’s established scientific strengths into greater industrial and commercial capability. Its priorities include research and innovation, quantum infrastructure, ecosystem development, security and defence applications, and the specialist skills necessary to support an expanding industry.

Proposed measures include a European quantum design facility and six quantum chip pilot lines, alongside initiatives intended to strengthen the region’s industrial ecosystem. A proposed European Quantum Act is also intended to support the transition from scientific excellence towards industrial leadership.

These initiatives address a genuine strategic concern. Europe has a strong scientific base and an established network of specialist technology companies, but research leadership alone does not guarantee the ability to manufacture, deploy and commercialise advanced systems at scale.

However, the international character of quantum supply chains means that strengthening European capability cannot realistically depend on reproducing every component or manufacturing process within the European Union.

Such an approach would require considerable investment, could duplicate existing specialist capabilities and might ultimately make European companies less competitive. In an industry where production volumes remain relatively small and individual technologies are still evolving, attempts to establish complete domestic supply chains could also divert resources away from areas where European companies already possess meaningful advantages.

A more practical industrial strategy would identify genuinely critical dependencies, encourage the development of alternative sources where necessary and strengthen trusted international partnerships where those relationships provide greater resilience than domestic duplication.

The objective should be to reduce unacceptable dependencies while preserving access to the technologies and markets required for commercial growth.

Sovereignty through resilience

This raises a broader question about how technological sovereignty should be defined in an internationally connected industry.

National control over important infrastructure will remain strategically valuable, particularly where technologies are associated with defence, security or critical national capabilities. Governments have legitimate reasons to protect sensitive research, secure manufacturing capacity and prevent excessive dependence on potentially unreliable suppliers.

However, resilience also depends on having options. A quantum technology company with access to multiple trusted suppliers, interoperable components and established international partnerships may be better positioned to withstand disruption than one dependent on a single domestic source.

Achieving that resilience will require a more detailed understanding of the quantum industrial ecosystem. Governments and companies will need to identify components that cannot easily be replaced, assess how export controls and trade restrictions could affect access to specialist equipment, and determine where additional manufacturing capability would deliver meaningful security benefits.

The same analysis must consider commercial consequences. Quantum technology companies need international customers to support continued investment, and policies that restrict access to foreign markets could undermine the very industrial capabilities governments are seeking to protect.

There is therefore a balance to be established between protecting strategically important technologies and maintaining the international relationships necessary for innovation, industrial development and eventual market growth.

An international industry needs an international strategy

The emerging quantum economy presents governments with a challenge familiar from other advanced technology sectors, but complicated by the relative immaturity of the market and the specialist nature of its supply chains.

National strategies can accelerate investment, build industrial capacity and support the development of strategically important capabilities. Their long-term effectiveness, however, will increasingly depend on how successfully they connect those national resources with the wider international ecosystem.

For Europe, the question is therefore becoming less about whether quantum technologies can be developed domestically and more about which capabilities must remain under European control, which dependencies require mitigation and where international cooperation can deliver the greatest strategic advantage.

These choices will help determine whether today’s public investment produces an internationally competitive industry or an expensive collection of national capabilities with limited commercial reach.

On Wednesday, The Quantum Space will publish its State of Quantum 2026 reposrt, examining the progress of quantum computing across hardware development, industrial infrastructure, global supply chains, investment and commercial adoption. The report explores how these different elements are developing and whether the emerging industry is creating the conditions necessary for a sustainable market.

As quantum computing enters its next stage of industrial development, the ability to manage international interdependence may prove just as important as the ability to develop the technology itself.